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(

CABIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSN, et al
(employers of pregnant
women)

v.

Cert to CA9
(Pre
Gilliam [dj])

rson,

or_

GUERRA, et aV (Califo
Federal/Civil
Fair
ployment
Officials)
SUMMARY:
challenge a California statue
employees who take

~erquson,

Timely
~
~ that

p to four months of maternity leave be

reinstated to their former jobs.

Petrs

California

&4 -l~tfj-_

Pzn)/
--)

statute is preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

u.s.c.

(PD~),

42

2000e(k).

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

A

Cali~ornia

statute requires

employers covered by title VII to grant pregnancy disability leave
of up to four months to their employees. Cal Gov't Code §12945(b) (2)
provides that
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification:
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions . . .
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a
reasonable period of time~ provided, such period shall
not exceed four months. Such employee shall be entitled
to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period
of time. Reasonable period of time means that period
during which the female employee is disabled on account
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
Regulations require such employers to reinstate such employees to
~

their old jobs at the end of the four months.

Failure to reinstate

to a former position is permissible only if business necessity makes
it impossible to do

so~

there is a rebuttable presumption that the

pregnant employee's position may be filled by a temporary employee.
One of petr Cal Fed's employees, Lillian Garland, was not
immediately offered her former position as a receptionist/PBX
operator when she sought to return from her four month pregnancy
leave.

Resp California Dep't of Fair Employment then filed a

complaint against petr for failure to reinstate Garland as required
by the California statute and regulations.
Cal Fed then filed this suit in district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
§12945(b) (2), on the grounds that the California provision

conflicted with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requirement that
pregnancy related disabilities be treated no differently from any
other disability.

42

u.s.c.

§2000e{k) provides that

{k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
2000e-2{h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise.
The de enjoined enforcement of the Cal statute, ruling that the
statute required reverse discrimination in favor of female employees
that is prohibited by title VII and constitutes an impermissible
classification based upon pregnancy prohibited by the PDA. ___Relying
on Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co v. EEOC, 462

u.s.

669

{1983), the de held that §12945{b) {2) impermissibly discriminates
against male employees.
CA9 reversed.

The unanimous panel relied upon title ''II's

narrow pre-emption clause, 42

u.s.c.

§§2000e-7, h-4, which evidences

an intent not to preempt more restrictive state antidiscrimination
laws: "nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as
invalidating any provision of state law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
thereof."

42

u.s.c.

§2000h-4.

CA9 then relied on the PDA's purpose

to reverse this Court's decisions holding that employer policies
treating pregnancy related disabilities less favorably than other
medical conditions did not constitute sex discrimination in
violation of title VII.

u.s.

125 {1976).

E.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429

The Court's decision in Newport News merely

required that pregnancy related disabilities be treated no less
'

favorably than other medical disabilities; neither the PDA nor
Newport News bars a state from requiring employers to take pregnancy
into account in a way that favors pregnant women.

While there is

some tension between PDA's first clause, which bars discrimination
against pregnancy (and thus recognizes pregnancy as a distinct
problem), and its second clause, which bars classification according
to pregnancy, this tension must be resolved in favor of achieving
affirmative equality in employment opportunities for women.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr points out that pregnancy favoring statutes

have been enacted in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Montana, as
well as in California, and that resolution of the validity of these
statutes under the PDA is thus an issue of national importance.

~he

plain language of the PDA explicitly bars any classification of
employees based upon pregnancy, and this language accords with the
intent of Congress that pregnant employees be treated no
differently--neither better nor worse--than non-pregnant employees.
The CA9 decision thus conflicts with the plain language and
intention of the PDA.

The CA9's decision is also in conflict with

EEOC guidelines which bar employers from implementing benefits
available only to pregnant women, and thus hampers enforcement of
title VII by the EEOC.

Petr also contends that the CA9 decision, by

upholding a statute premised on the assumption that women are a
special class in need of special state protection, establishes a
dangerous precedent that is in fact contrary to equal opportunity
for women.

Finally, the CA9 decision conflicts with this Court's

holding in Newport News, since that case stands for the principle

that differential treatment of pregnancy--whether it is women or men
who benefit from the differential treatment--violates the PDA ban
against pregnancy discrimination.
Resp emphasizes the narrow preemption clause of title VII:
state discrimination laws are preempted only if they require
employers to do that which is unlawful under title VII.

~he

legislative history of the PDA reflects that statutes similar to the
statute here involved were referred to with approval by the drafters
of the PDA.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 4749, 4759.

Resp argues that title VII is aimed at providing

equal opportunity to

women~

thus, state prohibition of no-leave

policies which have a disparate impact upon women is consonant with
that goal.

Resp points out that CADC has held that the denial of

leave may itself violate title VII because such a policy has a
disparate impact upon women of childbearing age.
Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (CADC 1981).

Abraham v. Graphic

Similarly, the EEOC

guidelines state that a no leave policy with a disparate impact upon
women violates title VII. 29 C.F.R. §1604.10(c)

(1985).

~aking

pregnancy into account in a way that lessens the impact of pregnancy
on women's employment opportunities is consistent with the dissent
in Gilbert, and thus consistent with PDA's purpose to overrule
Gilbert.

Finally, the statute provides no special protection for

women: it merely removes a substantial disadvantage suffered by
women.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS) has
submitted an amicus brief in support of petr.

Basically, CCUS

repeats the legislative history arguments of the petr, emphasizing

that Congress did not mean for women to get special benefits as the
result of the PDA.

CCUS also contends that the CA9 violates this

Court's understanding of the PDA in Newport News.
DISCUSSION:

An identical issue is presented by the

jurisdictional statement in No. 84-1545-ASX, Miller Wahl

~o.

v.

Montana Comm'r of Labor and Industry (May 16, 1985 Conference).

In

Miller-Wahl, the Montana S Ct upheld a state statute barring
discharge of an employee for a pregnancy related disability against
a PDA preemption challenge.

The

the VSG have yet to be received.

~ourt

CVSGed in Miller-Wahl, but

Since this petn presents the exact

same issue as Miller-Wahl, but in a cleaner procedural context, T
recommend relisting this case with Miller-Wahl with a view to a
grant and argument in tandem should the Court give plenary
consideration to that appeal.
I recommend relisting this petn with No. 84-1545-ASX.
There is a response and a reply.
October 31, 1985

Coplan

Opn in petn
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No. 85-494, California Federal Savin~s & Loan Association, et al.
v. Guerra, et al.
(Cali ornia officia l s) (CA 9)
Memorandum to File
This case presents the question 'tvhether Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978, preempts the California statute also adopted in 1978.
Title VII is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that includes
specific provisions with respect to the preemption of state
legislation.

Section 1104 provides:

"Nothing contained in any title of this
1/H ~ J.o
Act shall be construed as indicating an
~
intent on the part of Congress to occupy
~ ~
the field in which any such title operates
~ ~
to the exclusion of State laws on the same
b ~~~~ J~-5~
subject matter, nor shall any provision of
~~
this Act be construed as invalidating any
~~ ~ ~ ~
provision of State law u~ s such P-rovision
~> ~ :1~ v ~ i q_,1\.lnrcnsis t.ep t 'with any o.f the purposes of
~ ~-- th~ s Af_t, or ar;y--prQvisiop_ the.uof."
-5'1-~~w~--·-

~

Although the foregoing section leaves the states free to

enact certain legislation, it also provides that a state law
shall not be "inconsistent with any of the purposes of this
act, or any provision thereof".

Title VII, as amended by the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, now includes a prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions", and declares that women affected

No. 85-494

2.

by pregnancy "shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes .. . as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work."
The California pregnancy disability law, at issue in
this case, shares many of the same goals as the Federal Act.
It achieves its purposes, however, in a somewhat different
manner.

It accords special treatment to pregnant female

employees by requiring that employers guarantee those employees
disability leave up to four months, and provides quite explicit
reinstatement rights, regardless of the employer's disability
leave policies toward other employees.

Thus, as argued by peti-

tioners - and also by the SG in his amicus brief - the state law
is in conflict with the basic principle of equal treatment of male
and female employees contemplated by Title VII and specifically
extended to pregnancy based classifications by the 1978 Act.
This case turns primarily on the fact that the California
Act requires benefits for pregnancy disability that are not
required in California for other employees.
The DC held that the California Act was preempted by Title
VII as amended in 1978 because of its guarantee of special
treatment for pregnancy disabled employees.

The CA reversed the

DC, holding that nothing in the Federal Act prevented a state
from providing more favorable treatment to pregnant employees.

i.\1 0

.

8 5- 4 9 4

3.

We granted cert to decide the preemption issue as the question
may be important

~7ith

respect to other state laws.

Petitioners' brief, prepared by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
and the SC's amicus brief, make persuasive arguments in support
of preemption .

The brief on behalf of respondents by the

Attorney General of California also is a strong brief.

In

addition, there are several amicus briefs only two of which I
have looked at preliminarily:

one on behalf of the Chamber of

Commerce of the United States that supports reversal of CA 9,
and one on behalf of the American Federation of Labor that supports affirmance.

Neither of these briefs adds significantly

to the principal briefs of the parties.
The SG relies particularly on § 2000e(k) of Title VII
as amended that reads as follows:
"[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work ·k ·k ·k."

Relying primarily on the foregoing language, and the basic
purpose of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination, the SG
and petitioners argue that Title VII bars any difference in
treatment on the basis of pregnancy.

The basic purpose of the

No. 85-494

4.

Federal statute is to assure "equal treatment of male and
female employees."

This view is supported by language in

the Reports of both the House and Senate that also emphasize
equal treatment .

The argument therefore is made that the

California statute conflicts with Federal law because it
provides preferential treatment for pregnant employees.
Section 12945(b)(2) of the California law requires employers
to reinstate female employees returning from pregnancy disability leave to the job they previously held, unless that
position is no longer available due to "business necessity",
in which case the employer must make a reasonable good faith
effort to reinstate the employee to a substantially similar
job."

Neither side in this controversy argues that these

provisions lack substantive merit.

Rather, the only question

before us is 111hether the requirement of the Federal Act for
"equal treatment" prevents a state from providing more
favorable treatment to pregnant women than it provides - for
example - to men who for some other disability are placed on
leave and then return to work.
The California Attorney General acknowledges that the
state statute "supplements" the protection afforded pregnant
women under the Federal law, but argues that the authority of

5.

No. 85-494

the states to enact laws more favorable to pregnant women
are not preempted.

Generally, I think the Federal govern-

ment should allow the states wide latitude in employment
matters, especially where the state is the employee.
view has not prevailed.

But my

See my dissenting opinion in Garcia.

I am tentatively inclined to think that petitioners and the
SG have the better of the preemption argument in this case.
I am not at rest, however, and will be interested in the views
of my law clerk.

L.F.P.

lsg 08/13/86

~ K/7.;

~~ . -~

August 13, 1986
From:

Leslie
No. 85-494, California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra

Cert. to CA9 (Pregerson, Ferguson, C.J.s,

Gilliam, D.J.)

Wednesday, Oct. 8, 1986 (first case)

I

The need to eliminate discrimination against women on the
basis of their pregnancy prompted both the federal Government and
various states to enact laws designed to achieve this goal.
case involves two such
nation Act of

1~8

statutes ~ he

(PDA)

and~n

Employment and Housing Act.

This

federal Pregnancy Discrimi-

amendment to the California Fair

The issue presented is whether the

...------

PDA preempts the California statute, which requires that employers grant pregnant women a reasonable leave and job security during the leave period.

II
The California statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification:

(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female
employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions ...•

( 2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a
reasonable period of tlme;
provided, such period shall
not exceed four months.
Such employee shall be entitled to utiliz
an accrued vacation leave ~uring this
per1od of time.
Reasonab e per1o o
t1m~ means that
period during which the female employee is disabled on
account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
cond it i<\ms ..•.
Cal. Gov't Code §12945.

This has been interpreted by resps, the~

California Fair Employment and Housing Commission and its officers,

-

as requiring employers to provide pregnant employees with
---"'---~

-

~

unpaid disability leave for the period of their disability and to
reinstate

employees

~

previously held,

returning

from

pregnancy

leave

to

the

job

______

unless that position is no longer
......__...,available due

- ---

to business necessit~ in which case the employer must attempt to
reinstate the employee to a substantially similar job.
Federal law regarding discrimination on the basis of preg- ~
(V]l \
....___
nancy is embodied in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, -an! amendment

to Title VII.

v

Title VII provides

that

it

is an unlawful

employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any
individual •..

because of such individual's ... sex."

nancy Discrimination Act, added in 1978, provides:

The Preg-

The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions:
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, ....
42

u.s.c.

§2000e(k).

Title VII speaks to the issue

of ~reemption
~

as follows:

f

>
42

Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject
matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law .
less such
ovision is 'nconsistent with any of the
purposes of this Act or any provision t ereo .

.Y,n-JV

~-;:::.

u.s.c.

§2000h-4.

Petr California Federal Savings and Loan

Asso~

Fed) is an employer within the meaning of both the Cal
and Title VII.
abilities,

Cal Fed's disability leave policy

cover~

including those caused by pregnancy.

The pt

lows all employees to take disability leave, but does not
"leave"

to

guarantee

the

absent business necessity.

returning
Under

employee

the

same

its leave policy,

pc..

the company

~Jge 4.

.L

~~-~f~~

~f-lo~~~

must make a good faith effort to prove { h ;
ilar and suitable position.

,,

~~ ~~ !~J

If~~~~~~~-=~·~
one is not available,

however,
---

\)

Cal Fed may terminate the employee.

In May 1983, resp California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing issued an administrative accusation against petr on behalf of an employee who was not
immediately reinstated to her previous position at the conclusion
of her pregnancy leave.

She was ultimately reinstated to a simi-

lar position six months later.
Petr, joined by other aggrieved employers, brought suit in
federal district court,

seeking a declaratory judgment that the

California pregnancy disability law
and

an

injunction

cross-motions

for

against

its

is preempted by Title VII,

enforcement.

The

parties

filed

summary judgment based upon stipulated facts.

The ~C held in favor of petrs, finding the California law "inconsistent with

the purpose of Congress

in enacting

the

[PDA]

bc:to ~

~·

eliminate classifications based on pregnancy and with the pur- ~
poses of Title VII to provide equal treatment for males and females."

The DC thus found the Califonia law preempted by Title

VII because the state law required or permitted conduct unlawful

f'/J1

under Title VII.

v

-

Resps appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed.

The

CA9 examined this Court's decision in Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).

In Newport News, this

--------

Court found that a company could not exclude pregnancy coverage
for a male employee's wife
ful~

under

the

company disability plan.

(You

joined

JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent in which he found Title VII to cover

only discrimination
their dependants) .
port News,

in

the

benefit

coverage

of

employees,

not

The CA9 quoted the ma.j or i ty opinion in New-

which extended pregnancy coverage to male employees'

wives even though "[t]he cost of providing complete health insurance

coverage

for

the dependants

of male

employees,

including

pregnant wives, might exceed the cost of providing such coverage
for

the dependents of

Loan Ass'n v.
found

Guerra,

"no principled

days

from

female employees."

California Savings

758 F.

(CA9

2d 390,

396

1985).

&

The CA9

reason to distinguish pregnancy disability

pregnancy

disability

dollars."

Ibid.
-

The

CA9

found that the PDA created only "a floor beneath which pregnancy
disability benefits may not drop -they may not rise."
VII was

Ibid.

"equality of

treatment."

Id.

v

ceiling above which

The CA9 found that the goal of Title

opportunity,

at 396 n.

not a

7.

not

necessarily

Consequently,

sameness

of

the CA9 concluded

that the California law extending preferential treatment to pregnancy-related disabilities was not inconsistent with the goals of
Title VII and thus was not preempted.
III
The

first

issue

to be

resolved

is whether

the PDA pre-

cludes preferential treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities.
~

If the CA9 is correct that the PDA merely establishes a floor on
pregnancy disability benefits,

then the California statute, even

if interpreted to allow employers to treat pregnancy differently
from other disabilities, is not in conflict with the PDA.
l'-~ Vii

There is no question that the PDA aces not require preferential treatment of pregnancy.

The language of the PDA itself

states that "women affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the
'

same

•.•

as other persons not so affected but similar in their

ability or inability to work."

The legislative history confirms

that the PDA:
does not require employers to treat pregnant employees
in any particular manner ... and in no way requires the
institution of any new programs where none currently ~
exist.
The bill would simply }\require" that pregnant [ ~ ...
women be ~ as otner employees on the
~ ·
basis of their ability or inability to work.
/~
J

The question ~

H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).

is whether this same language mandates equal treatment of preg-

~

nancy and all other d}sabilities.
"The starting point

~---

in every case involving construction

of a statute is the language itself."

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor

Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
states

that pregnant women shall be

treated

the

7Zi-L4.

The

J7'il

P~

same as other

individuals with similar disabilities, according to their ability
to work.

The

identical."

common

definj tion

of

"same"

is

"not different: )

The American Heritage Dictionary 114 7

Senate Report confirms this definition,

( 1976).

The )~

"[T]his bill would pre-

vent employers from treating pregnancy and childbirth differently
from other causes of disability."
1st Sess.

4

S. Rep. no.

331, 95th Cong.,

This Court will "give effect to

(1977).

..

plain

language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended
the

language

to

have

some more

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
Here,

there

are

u.s.

good

restrictive meaning."

Shaw v.

85, 97 (1983).

reasons

to believe

language of the PDA means what it says.

that

the plain

The general rule under

Title VII is that employers cannot make sex-based classifications
'

when

functional

Title VII
groups.

is

on

individual

Texas Dept.

Power

v.

Manhart,

are possible.

ability,

not

focus

under

generalizations

about

of Community Affairs v.

(Powell, J.);

248, 259 (1981)
&

classifications

435 U.S.

The

Burdine,

450

u.s.

City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
702,

708

(1978).

The PDA echoes

this concept by requiring that pregnant women "be treated ..• the
on the basis of "their ability or

same ... as other persons"
inability

to

work."

The

legislative

history

reinforces

this

view:
[T] he bill rejects the view that employers may treat
pregnancy and its incidents as sui gener is, without
regard to its functional comparability to other conditions.
S. Rep. at 4.
Resps make much of the fact that the House and Senate Committee Reports note many state statutes dealing with pregnancy, a
few of which are similar to the California statute at issue here.
There is no indication, however, that Congress approved preferential treatment for pregnancy.

In fact,

in light of the develop-

ments of Title VII law at the time of the enactment of the PDA,
the opposite inference is more compelling.
was

enacted,

legislation,

courts
and

had

uniformly

By 1978 when the PDA

invalidated

state protective

the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination re-

quired that any preference given to females by state statute be
extended

to males.

29 C.F.R.

§1604.2(b)(l975).

These develop-

ments reinforce the view that Congress meant what it said when it

page 8.

required that pregnant women be

tr~ated

"the same" as other dis-

abled workers.
Resps argue that reading the second clause of the PDA to
mandate equal treatment among disabilities would contradict the
first clause which makes pregnancy a protected sexual characteris tic

under

Title

That

VII.

is,

only

by

treating

pregnancy

differently than other disabilities can equal employment opportunity be achieved.

Because this view was adopted by the CA9 and

is superficially appealing, it requires some discussion.
Title VII guarantees equal employment opportunity to women
and men.
other

/

Resps contend that treating pregnancy "the same" as any

disability

bec::~_use

would

result

in

discrimination

against women

According to resps,

only women get pregnant.

-------M--

Califor-

nia's statute furthers the goal of employment opportunity because
it "merely removes a burden uniquely faced by female employees."
Resp. Br. at 14.

Thus, the California legislation is a progres-

sive

ensuring

step

toward

that

the

employment

opportunity

of

women and men is "the same" even though women are ostensibly provided
~

greater

disability

coverage.

Resps

in effect

rely on a

common sense approach to support their contention that pregnancy
is so different from any other disability that Congress must have
meant to allow unequal treatment of pregnancy and other disabili ties

in order

women and men.

to achieve equal employment opportunity between
Close analysis reveals, however, that resps'

the- ~

ory is flawed.
""

The history and language of the PDA indicate the manner in
which pregnancy was intended to operate as a protected character-

istic under Title VII.

The PDA was enacted

to overrule this

I

Court's decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Corp., 429

u.s.

In that case, the Court held that exclusion of preg-

125 (1976).

nancy disability from a company disability plan was not sex-based
discrimination and therefore was not prohibited by Title VII.
The Court in Gilbert reasoned that the distinction made in exeluding pregnancy from an employee benefit plan was between pregnan t people and nonpregnant people, not between women and men.
429

u.s. at

134-135.

Thus, according to the Court, pregnancy-

based discrimination was not sex-based and was not prohibited by
Title VII.
the PDA.

Congress rejected this interpretation of pregnancy in
The PDA includes "because of pregnancy" in the defini-

tion of "because of sex", thus explicitly defining pregnancy discrimination as sex-based discrimination.
It is important to note that Congress included pregnancy
as a sex-based category of discrimination, not in a category by
itself.

Thus, pregnancy is a protected characteristic because it

is sex-based.
pact analysis.

Resps confuse this concept in their disparate imObviously,

if

an employer

has

a leave policy

which is inadequate to accomodate pregnancy, then pregnant people
will be disadvantaged vis-a-vis other workers.
not the relevant inquiry.

This, however, is

Because pregnancy is defined in Title

VII as a sex-based characteristic, any disparate impact analysis
must compare the impact of a leave policy on women as opposed to
men.
Resps'

"equal employment opportunity" argument must rely

on an assumption that without guaranteed leave and job protection

1:"'" - : ; J -

,.,_ ...,.

for pregnancy, women will be denied equal employment opportunity
I

because of

their

sex.

Resps offer

little

factual

support

for

this position and offer no evidence which compares the impact on
the sexes of a restrictive leave policy.
simply,

is

that

in a

hypothetical

Resps' ; heory, stated

situation where

I

no leave is

allowed for any disability, women will suffer a disparate impact
because pregnancy would require them to lose their jobs.
trast, men could have children and retain their jobs.
parate impact analysis,

however,

tion

the

that

pregnancy

is

incurred by one sex.
by women because of
that

during

a

In conThis dis-

relies on the unproven assump-

only

disability disproportionately

Certainly, pregnancy is uniquely incurred
their biology and

certain

period

of

time

childbirth, women are unable to work.

it

is a biological fact

during

pregnancy and/or

But, there must be a num-

ber of injuries which are disproportionately incurred by men and

~

which render men unable to wor •
statistically significant difference in disability leave required
by men and women, rebutting any "common sense" notion that women
as a

group require greater leave time than men because of the

biological fact that only women get pregnant.
Resps'

theoretical error

is that they focus on one life

activity which imposes a greater disability burden on women than
men.

In regard to employment opportunity,

however,

their focus

is too narrow because they fail to realize that life consists of
a number of activities, the burden of which may be disproportionately borne by one sex for
For

example,

it

is a

biological or sociological reasons.

-------

biologi~al_~~

pd~~

Men may thus disproportionately

physically stronger than women.
engage in heavy lifting.
bilitating back injuries.

J.J..

'

Heavy lifting is a major cause of deFailure to provide a reasonable leave

period for back injuries would have a disparate impact on male
employment opportunity.

To take this argument to its extreme,

moving heavy furniture may require men to lose their jobs whereas
women can get heavy furniture moved and retain their jobs.
resps'

assertion

that mandatory pregnancy

Thus,

leave policy simply

equalizes the sexes is too facile in that it fails to account for
other disabilities which, although not as clearly incurred by one
sex as pregnancy, nevertheless are disproportionately incurred by
one sex.

~liance

by resps and the CA9 on Newport News, supra, to

support pregnancy-based classifications is similarly misplaced.
The Court in Newport News found an employee benefit plan discriminatory because it denied payment for pregnancies incurred by
the wives of male employees.

The theory was that the male em-

---

ployees' benefit package was less complete because all risks were
covered for female employees but not for male employees.
-~

..

---

Under

..__.....~~...........,

this reasoning, it should be similarly invalid for an employer to
provide greater coverage for one sex-specific risk
-

than for others.

pregnancy -

In such a situation, male employees would

receive a less inclusive benefit plan than female employees because none of their sex-specific risks would be covered whereas
one sex-specific risk would be covered for female employees.
Court in Newport News noted that:

The

I

By making clear that an employer could not discriminate
on the basis of an employee's , pregnancy, Congress did
not erase the original prohibition against discrimination on the basis of an employee's sex.
462 U.S.

at 684-685.

This

is exactly the principle that resps

and the CA9 ignore.
Even resps'

basic argument that preferential treatment of

pregnancy removes a burden from female employment opportunity is
far from intuitive.

If employers are forced to provide greater

benefits for pregnancy as opposed to any other disabilities, they
may be more reluctant to hire women because of the potentially
greater disability liability.

Thus, Congress may well have de-

cided that equal employment opportunity is best achieved by completely equal treatment of all disabilities, including pregnancy.
In sum,
least

resps'

debateable

therefore fail

l

and

"equal opportunity"
is

probably

theory is at the very

theoretically

~
~~
·~

~~

Resps

to demonstrate that the words of the PDA cannot

logically be read to have their plain meaning.

~~~.

flawed.

Consequently, the

PDA should be read to mean what it appears to say -- that it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to treat pregnan-

cy differently from other disabilities.
IV
A finding that the PDA requires that employers treat pregnancy the same as other disabilities does not end the inquiry in
this case.

If an employer had a policy similar to the statute at

issue in this case and applied it in such a way that pregnancy
were treated differently from other disabilities, the employer's
policy would be invalid under Title VII. Here, however, the chal-

lenge is to a state statute, not to a particular employment practice.

Sex-based classifications in state statutes are not chal-

----·------------------· - ·classifications are normally

--------------~"""'---~-'--------

lenged directly under Title VII because Title VII only regulates
.........

employers' conduct.

Statutory

_

chal-

~

lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.
tion challenge

is not possible

has held

under

that

based classification.
Thus,

But an Equal Protec-

in this case because this Court

the Constitution,

pregnancy

Geduldig v. Aiello,

417

is not a sex-

u.s.

484

(1974).

it is not facially illegal for the state to use pregnancy
Any challenge to the state

as a classification in its statute.

~-~

statute here must focus on the statute's effect on employers, the
only parties regulated by Title VII.

Petrs therefore argue that

Title VII preempts enforcement of the California statute because
of the effect enforcement would have on employers.
Federal law may preempt

state law

in a

number of ways.

Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Board, 467 U.S. 461,
469

(1983).

which

Here, Congress has explicitly defined the extent to

it intended Title VII

to preempt state law:

where "such

law ..• purports to require or permit the doing of any act which
would be an unlawful employment practice under

u.s.c.

this title," 42

§2000e-7, or where a provision "is inconsistent with any

of the purposes of this Act or any provision thereof." 42 U.S.C.
§2000h-4.

Both

of

these

clauses

are

contained

in

paragraphs

which express the general policy of non-preemption of state law.
Moreover,

the

California

state's police power.

statute

was

enacted

pursuant

to

the

In this situation, "We start with the as-

sumption that the historic police powers of the State [are]

not

to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."
U.S. at 525
230).

Jones v.

Roth Packing Co.,

u.s.

(quoting Rice v.Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331

Thus,

there

is

a

430

presumption against preemption of

at
the

California statute.
Amici (instead of resps) argue that the California statute
does not require employers to do any unlawful act because it simply

requires

employers

to

provide

leave

for

pregnant

workers.

Employers thus remain free to provide leave on an equal basis to
all disabled workers

and

in this way can comply with both the

California statute and Title VII.
reconciliation

between

state

and

They argue that when such a
federal

law can be

found,

it

should be adopted in lieu of preemption.
Amici appear correct that the California statute does not
require employers to violate Title VII.

Whether the statute

~

mits employers to violate Title VII is a more difficult question.
Read in context, the "require or permit" language appears to address mandatory or permissive state statutes.

That is, a statute

would be preempted if it said employers "must classify employees
on the basis of pregnancy" or that they "may" do so.

A narrow

reading of "permit" follows from the general non-preemption goal
of Title VII.

Reading "permit" narrowly also seems the only way

to retain its meaning.

Any broader reading would render preempt-

ed under Title VII any statute which did not expressly forbid the
employment practices which

are

illegal under Title VII.

Thus,

because it does not contain an explicit mandate of unequal treatment of disabilities or a statement of permission, the California

statute does not appear to "require or permit" unlawful employment practices within the meaning of' Title VII.
But, the quick conclusion that Title VII does not preempt
the California statute would ignore the fact that the practical

------------------

result of a finding of non-preemption would be to read the Cali-

---------------

fornia statute to apply to all disabilities.

Although this Court

should strain to avoid a finding of preemption, "[t]he canon favoring

constructions of

statutes

to avoid constitutional ques-

tions does not •.• license a court to usurp the policymaking and
legislative functions of duly elected representatives."
v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984).
its

remedial

ture."

powers

to

"circumvent

Heckler

This Court should not use
the

intent of

Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 94

(1979)

the

leg isla-

(Powell, J.,

concurring and dissenting).
Here,
cates

that

the clear language of the California statute indi-j
the

state

legislature

benefits to pregnant women.

only

contemplated

extending

There is no indication that the leg-

islature intended such benefits across the board, except the fact
that the legislature contemplated that the PDA might be enacted
soon after the California statute.

It is a large leap to assume

that the legislature knew that the pregnancy distinction in its
statute would

then be unlawful and thus that the effect of the

California statute would be to extend benefits to all disabled
workers.

Had

the

legislators explicitly contemplated

this

re-

sult, they would not have limited the statutory wording to pregnancy.

The more logical inference to be drawn from the mention

of only one disability is

that

th~

legislature did not contem-

plate that the statute would apply to all disabilities.
A finding that the California legislature did not intend
its statute to apply to all disabilities is also a finding that
the

legislature

intended

to allow employers to treat pregnancy

differently from other disabilities.
statute,

it

indeed was intended to "permit the doing of . . . an

unlawful employment practice."
the

Under this reading of the

California

statute

preemption clause.

thus

When given its logical meaning,

falls

within

the

narrow Title VII

Under the same analysis, the California stat-

ute is also "inconsistent with [one] of the purposes of the Act,"
which is equal treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities, and
thus is preempted under the general Civil Rights Act preemption
clause.
Amici argue that even if the California statute is invalid
because

the

intent of

the California

legislature was

to allow

employers to treat pregnancy differently than other disabilities,
the proper
statute,
extension

remedy for

this Court to impose is extension of the

not nullification.
and

nullification

When faced with the choice between
of

a

statute,

this

Court

should

"measure the intensity of commitment to the residual policy and
consider

the

degree

of

potential

disruption

of

the

statutory

scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation."
Heckler, supra, 465 U.S. at 739.

Obviously, the California leg-

islature was committed to protecting pregnant women from employment discrimination.
a large degree.

The PDA, however, addresses this concern to

The California legislature's commitment to the

J::IQ':jl::

extra measure of guaranteed pregnancy leave
the second factor,

is unknown.

.J.. I

•

As to

the disruption to the statutory scheme from

extension of the statute to all disabilities appears potentially
large.

Amici indicate that only approximately 20% of all leave

taken by women is for pregnancy.

Extension of the statute would

thus pose a burden on employers potentially numerous times greater than that contemplated by the California legislature.

Amici

contend that extending benefits to all workers would not increase
costs significantly because the leave provided is unpaid.
another benefit provided is job reinstatement.

But,

It may well cost

employers more to keep the job open and work with temporary help
than to replace the worker.
The
cases

policy developed

where

a

by

state statute

this

is

Court

found

in Equal Protection

unconstitutional and

the

legislative intent regarding extension is not clear has usually
been to leave the decision of whether to extend or rescind benefits to the state.
446

u.s.

E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.,

142, 153 (1980)

with the state

("[B]ecause a remedial outcome consonent

legislature's overall purpose is preferable,

we

believe that state judges are better positioned to choose an appropriate method

of

remedying

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
U.S.
96

7 (1975);
(1979)

see also

(Powell,

J.,

the

constitutional

(1979);

violation.");

Stanton v. Stanton, 421

Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93concurring and dissenting)

(arguing for

invalidation of the federal statute rather than extension).

Ami-

ci point out that in Title VII cases, the trend has been the opposite.

But, these cases usually do not involve state sovereign-

ty and only pertain to a particular policy of a particular employer.

'

Thus,

in these cases a court is able to weigh the costs

imposed and make a decision based on facts in the record.
over,

in Title VII actions challenging a state statute this has

not been the clear trend.

See Homemakers, Inc. of Los Angeles v.

Division of Industrial Welfare,
denied,

u.s.

423

1063

(1976);

ment Discrimination Law

369

Homemakers have opted for

509 F.

2d 20

B. Schlei
( 2d

ed.

&

1983)

1

state

is

(CA9 1974), cert.

P. Grossman, Employ("Most courts

invalidation not extension.").

state legislative judgments are at issue.
the

More-

appropriate,

since
Here,

Because deference to

~~~~
~d"' extension

invalidation as e~pooed

~·~ r'l/~

appears the better remedy.

'\

v

--vit

I

In conclusion, th ~ mandates that employers treat pregnancy the same as other disabilities.

The California statute at

issue does not "require" employers to commit an unlawful employment practice, because employers could comply with both Title VII
and the California statute by extending guaranteed leave benefits
to

all

reading

individuals
the

suffering

California

from

statute

to

disabilities.
require

Nevertheless,

employers

to

extend

such benefits to all disabled employees does not comport with the
probable legislative intent and would impose a potentially great
burden on employers.
ture,

Because deference is due the state legisla-

the better approach appears to be to give the California
logical meaning and find it preempted by Title VII as
----,

"permitting" e ployers to make unlawful pregnancy-based classifi-

cations and as inconsistent with the goal of equal treatment of
all disabilities.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

October

(

Leslie

No. 85-494, California Savings and Loan v. Guerra
My understanding
finding

is that there may well be a Court for

the California pregnancy statute not preempted.

are two different theories for reaching this result.

There

I know that

at least Justice Stevens does not plan to choose between the two.
The first theory is that the words of the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act

are

ambiguous.

The

first

clause

treat pregnancy as a sex-based characteristic.
impact analysis would normally apply.

purports

to

Thus, disparate

The second clause states

that pregnancy shall be treated the same as other disabilities.
This is at odds with the disparate impact theory, so the statute
is ambiguous.

Next, one looks at the legislative history.

There

page L.

is absolutely no indication that Congress

~anted

to prohibit any

sort of disparate impact analysis on the basis of pregnancy.

The

second clause was merely clarifying that Congress was overruling
Gilbert, and that pregnancy could not be treated any worse than
other disabilities.

As to the California statute, it provides a

benefit to pregnant women.
their sex.

For example,

It does

not burden men because of

an employer would be allowed to estab-

lish a sickle cell anemia testing program for its employees without violating Title VII.
the same type of thing.
procreative freedom.

Treating pregnancy more favorably

is

The theory of trye California statute is

As such,

the California statute is not in

conflict with Title VII, which seeks equal employment opportunity.

As

added

to

to

the

limit

preemption provisions
preemption,

not

to

of Title VII,

expand

it.

Title VII is to expand employment opportunity.
purpose

behind

the

California

statute.

The

they were
purpose of

That is the same

Thus,

the

California

statute is not inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII.
The second theory proceeds on the assumption that Title
VII mandates that pregnancy be treated the same as other disabilities.

Even

preempt

the

assuming
California

with both statutes.
opportunity,

this

and

interpretation,

statute

because

an

Title VII
employer

does

can

not

comply

The purpose of Title VII is equal employment

the California statute promotes this.

If the

necessary result of the intersection of the two statutes is that
employers must extend disability benefits to cover all disabilities,
system.

then

that

is

the

necessary result of our

federal/state

I

Ko.

__..

California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra
'
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RE:
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1986

No. 85-494 - California v. Guerra

. Dear Byron:
Will you take on a dissent in this case?

Regards,
Justice White
Copy to Justice Powell

/

BlacL.~l'•.

Justice
r:Tustice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Powell
Stevens
O'Connor
Scalia

From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated: NOV 3 · 1986

~culated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-494

CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARK GUERRA,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1986]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy.
·
I
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
Cal. Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp.
1985-1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits dis- ·
crimination in employment and housing. In September
1978, California amended the FEHA to proscribe certain
fonns of employinent discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978 Cal. Stats.
ch. 1321, § 1, p. 4320-4322, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code
Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). 1 Subsection (b)(2)-the pro1

Section 12945(b)(2) provides, in relevant part:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification:
"(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ....

f/1i ~
yo~

.
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vision at issue here-is the only portion of the statute that
applies to employers subject to Title VII. See § 12945(e). 2
It requires these employers to provide female employees an
unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the
state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA, 3 has con"(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of
time; provided, such period shall not exceed four months. . . . Reasonable
period of time means that period during which the female employee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions. . . ."
"An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pursuant to this section to give reasonable notice of the date such leave shall
commence and the estimated duration of such leave."
Originally, the statute was intended to reverse, as to California employers, the rule established by this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). At the time, California law prohibited
school districts from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, see former
Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.2, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 12943 (West 1980). The first version of§ 12945 simply imposed this requirement on all California employers with five or more employees. As a ·
result of employer opposition, however, the measure was amended to include the various provisions now found in § 12945.
2
Aware that legislation on this subject was pending before Congress,
the State Legislature added the following section:
"In the event Congress enacts legislation amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
the provisions of this act, except paragraph (2) of subsection (b) .. . shall
be inapplicable to any employer subject to such federal laws.... " 1978
Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 4, p. 4322.
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, this section rendered the state law, except subsection (b)(2), invalid as applied to
all employers covered by Title VII. California subsequently adopted subsection (e), which provides:
"The provisions of this section, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b),
shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964."
3
See Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 12935(a)(l) and 12935(h). Respondent
Department of Fair Employment and Housing is the state agency charged
with enforcing the FEHA. See § 12930.
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strued § 12945(b)(2) to require California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to
the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available
due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer
must make a reasonable, good faith effort to place the employee in a substantially similar job. 4 The statute does not
compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employees. Because unpaid leave is meaningless unless there is a
job to which to return, the only benefit pregnant workers actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to
reinstatement.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex.
However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125
(1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. 5 In
• The parties have stipulated that the Commission's interpretation of
§ 12945(b)(2) is set forth in its proposed regulation, Cal. Admin. Code tit. 2,
§ 7291.2. See ~so Matter of the Accusation of the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing v. Travel Express, Case No. FEP80-81
A7-0992s N18709 (May 26, 1983) (precedential Commission decision construing § 12945(b)(2)).
5
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court held that an otherwise
comprehensive disability insurance plan·did not violate Title VII because it
failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Relying on Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974), which upheld a similar plan against a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, the Court concluded that
removing pregnancy from the list of compensable' disabilities was not discrimination on the basis of sex. 429 U. S., at 133-136. The Court further
held that "(a]s there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to
men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme . . .. " /d., at 138.
Three members of the Court dissented. See id., at 146 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting); id. , at 160 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices
would have held that the employer's disability plan discriminated on the
basis of sex by giving men protection for all categories of risk but giving
women only partial protection.

--~--- - - ··~- · ·
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response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 6
II
Petitioner California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan association based in Los Angeles; it is an employer covered by
both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neutral leave policy that permits employees who have completed
three months of service to take unpaid leave of absence for a
variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Although it is Cal Fed's policy to try to provide an employee
taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning,
Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an employee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is
not available.
Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist
for several years. In January 1982 she took a pregnancy disability leave. When she was able to return to work in April
In Nashville Gas Co . v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 143-146 (1977), the Court
relied on Gilbert to uphold an employer's sick-leave policy that excluded
pregnancy.
8
The PDA added subsection (k) to § 701, the definitional section of Title
VII. Subsection (k) provides, in relevant part:
"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes, including the receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similarly situated in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall
be interpreted to permit otherwise."
The legislative history of the PDA reflects Congress' approval of the views
of the dissenters in Gilbert. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 678-679 & nn. 15-17 (1983) (citing legislative
history) .

, - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
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of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was informed that
her job had been filled and that there were no receptionist or
similar positions available. Garland filed a complaint with
respondent Department of Fair Employment and Housing,
which issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on
her behalf. 7 Respondent charged Cal Fed with violating
§ 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the scheduled hearing
before respondent Fair Housing and Employment Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of Commerce, 8 brought this action in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. They sought a
declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with and preempted by Title VII and an injunction against enforcement of
the section. 9 In an unreported decision, the District Court
granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Citing
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
. U. S. 669 (1983), 10 the court stated that "California employers.
1
Cal Fed reinstated Garland in a receptionist position in November
1982, seven months after she first notified it that she was able to return to
work.
8
Petitioner Merchants and Manufacturers Association is a trade association that represents numerous employers throughout the State of California. Petitioner California Chamber of Commerce also represents many
California businesses. Both organizations have members that are subject
to both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2) and have disability leave policies similar
to Cal Fed's.
9
Petitioners' complaint also alleged that the California disability leave
. statute was pre-.e mpted by § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The parties stipulated that
the petitioners' ERISA claim would be dismissed without prejudice. App.
9-10.
10
In Newport News, the Court evaluated a health insurance plan that
provided female employees with benefits for pregnancy-related conditions
to the same extent as for other medical conditions, but provided less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees. The Court found
that this limitation discriminated against male employees with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment in
violation § 703(a)(l) of Title VII. "The 1978 Act [the PDA] makes clear

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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who comply with state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits brought by temporarily disabled males who do not
receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by
pregnancy . . . ." On this basis, the District Court held that
"California state law and the policies of interpretation and enforcement . . . which require preferential treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions are preempted by Title VII and are null,
void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution." !I
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 758 F . 2d 390 (1985). It held that "the district
court's conclusion that section 12945(b)(2) discriminates
against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense,
misinterprets case law and flouts Title VII and the PDA."
!d., at 393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading of
NetVport News, the Court of Appeals found that the PDA
does not "demand that state law be blind to pregnancy's existence." . I d., at 395. The court held that in enacting the
PDA Congress intended "to construct a floor beneath which
pregnancy. disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling
above which they may not rise." I d., at 396. Because it
found that the California statute furthers the goal of equal
employment opportunity for women, the Court of Appeals
that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other conditions. Thus petitioner's plan unlawfully gives married male employees a benefits package for their dependents that is less
inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married female employees." 462 U. S. , at 684.
11
After the District Court entered its judgment, Garland moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). The District Court denied
her motion on several grounds: untimeliness, lack of a "direct and substantial" interest in the litigation, and adequate representation of her interests
by defendants. Her appeal from the. order denying intervention was consolidated with the appeal on the merits. In an unreported order, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention;
Garland did not seek review of that decision here.

-====~--========~~========~~~====~--~~~--====~
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concluded: "Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with,
nor unlawful under, Title VII." Ibid.
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1986), and we now
affirm.

III
In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by
federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the
intent of Congress. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S.
497, 504 (1978). Federal law may supersede state law in
several different ways. First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law
by so stating in express terms. E. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S: 519, 525 (1977). Second, congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).
Neither of these bases for pre-emption exists in this case.
Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent to categorically
pre-empt state law or to "occupy the field" of employment
discriminationlaw. See42U. S.C. §§2000e-7and2000h-4.
As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has
not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict occurs either because
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or because the state law
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purpose and objectives of Congress." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Michigan Canners

:·_: :;-=========~====~==--=====-===:::=::=:-::-.:-.--,.,...:-:---:_:.,--===-

--,=.

- ---- - · · -··--=::-:::.-:=-. - ·-··

815-494-0PINION
8

CALIFORNIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

& Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining
Board, 467 U. S. 461, 478 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982). Nevertheless, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed. See
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981). This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in this case. In
two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, § 708 and § 1104,
Congress has indicated that state laws will be pre-empted
only if they actually conflict with federal law. Section 708 of
Title VII provides:
"Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or
punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any
such law which purports to require or permit the doing
of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title." § 2000e-7
·
Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil
Rights Act, establishes the following standard for preemption:
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to
occupy .the .field in which any such title operates to the
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor
shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof." § 2000h-4
Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressional intent to
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title
VII; these two sections provide a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority" to regulate
employment practice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra,
at 505. We therefore must consider whether § 12945 "re-

-------~--------------------------~----------------------------------------

85-494-0PINION
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

9

quires or permits" employers to violate Title VII or is inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII.
A
We turn first to § 708, the statutory provision specifically
addressed to pre-emption under Title VII. The House Report on the bill from which the language of§ 708 was drawn
indicates that this section "might be called an anti-preemption provision." H. R. Rep. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 3 (1962). Instead of pre-empting state fair employment
laws, § 708 "'simply left them where they were before the enactment of Title VII."' Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 103 n. 24 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v.
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (Conn. 1978), affirmance order,
603 F. 2d 214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1031
(1980)). The narrow scope of pre-emption available under
§ 708 reflects the importance Congress attached to state antidiscrimination laws in achieving Title VII's goal of equal employment opportunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., supra, at 101-102; Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468-469, 472, 477 (1982); New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63-65
(1980). 12 The legislative history of the PDA also supports a
narrow interpretation of § 708. 13 Applying these principles
in Shaw, we concluded that Title VII did not pre-empt a New
For example, where state or local law prohibits an employment practice, § 706(c) requires deferral of federal enforcement until state or local officials have an opportunity "to act under such State or local law to remedy
the practice alleged." § 2000e-5(c).
11
See, e. g, S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3 n. 1 (1977) (state laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would not be pre-empted, "(s]ince
title VII does not 'pre-empt State laws which would not require violating
title VII"), Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
'1978 (Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources), p. 40 (1979) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); 123 Gong. Rec .
. 29643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (state laws that create a "clear conflict" would be pre-empted).
11

85-494---0PINION
10

CALIFORNIA FEDERALS. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

York statute which proscribed discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy as sex discrimination, at a time when Title VII did
not equate the two. 463 U. S. , at 100-104.
Petitioners contend that the PDA requires equal treatment
of pregnancy and other disabilities. Their argument rests on
an excessively literal reading of the second clause of the Act:
"[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but
similarly situated in their ability or inability to work."
§ 2000e(k). They argue that, because Title VII forbids an
employer to treat a pregnant employee any differently than
other disabled employees and because, whatever an employer's leave and reinstatement policy for disabled employees
generally, § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide reasonable unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers,
the California statute requires them to violate Title VII, as
amended by the PDA.
Even if we construed the PDA to require employers to
treat pregnancy no better than other disabilities, the California statute in no way "requires" employers to violate Title
VII. 14 If the federal statute forbids employers to provide unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers and not to
other disabled employees, a question we address below,
§ 12945(b)(2) does not prevent employers from complying
with federal as well as the state law simply by raising the
level of benefits to other disabled employees. This is not a
case where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where
there is an "inevitable collision between the two schemes of
14
Because the California statute is couched in mandatory rather than
permissive terms, the issue is whether it is pre-empted because it requires
rather than permits employers to violate Title VII. Cf. Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Board, 467 U. S.
461, 478 n. 21 (1984).
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regulation." Id., at 143. Section 12945(b)(2) does not compel California employers to treat pregnant workers better
than other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits
that employers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant
workers. Employers are free to extend comparable benefits
to other disabled employees, thereby treating "women affected by pregnancy" the same as "other persons not so affected but similarly situated in their ability or inability to
work." 15
We recognize that reading the state and federal statutes
together in this fashion may yield a result that neither statute independently requires. Whenever there is concurrent
state and federal regulation in a particular area, however,
the intersection of the two layers of regulation may have results different from those intended by either of the regulating
authorities. 16 Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U. S. 117, 131 n. 22 (1978) (state statute requiring oil refiners to give "voluntary allowances" to service stations not
pre-empted despite the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act
may compel its extension to out-of-state stations). In the
Title VII context, such a result is the logical consequence of
Congress' decision to allow the States a significant role in the
formulation of antidiscrimination law. Each government is
allowed to pursue its own policy. The State's decision that
equal employment opportunity for pregnant workers requires at a minimum reasonable unpaid leave with job protec15
Indeed, at oral argument, petitioners conceded that compliance with
both "is theoretically possible." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
" Moreover, Congress and the California Legislature were each aware in
general terms of the ·regulatory scheme adopted by the other when they
enacted their legislation. California recognized that many of its provisions
would be pre-empted by the PDA and, accordingly, exempted employers
covered by Title VII from all portions of the statute except those guaranteeing unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers. Congress
was aware that some state laws mandated certain benefits for pregnant
workers, but did not indicate that they would be pre-empted by federal
law. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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tion is given effect, as is the federal government's policy of
equal treatment.
Petitioners argue that "extension" of the state statute to
cover other employees is inappropriate in the absence of a
- clear indication that this is what the California legislature intended. They cite cases in which this Court has declined to
rewrite underinclusive state statutes found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Wrengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393 n. 13 (1979). This argument is beside the point. Extension is a remedial option
to be exercised by a court once a statute is found to be
invalid. See, e. g., Califano v. Wescott, 443 U. S. 76, 89
(1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)). Since the statute does not require that pregnant workers be treated
differently, we need not address the relative merits of extension and nullification.
B

Having determined that the California statute does not require an employer to violate Title VII and is therefore not
pre-empted under § 708, we next consider whether it is preempted under § 1104. The legislative history indicates that
this section, like § 708, must be read narrowly. It was not
intended to extend significantly the scope of pre-emption
available under § 708. 17 Accordingly, our inquiry is limited
Representative Meader, one of the sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, proposed the precursor to § 1104 as an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act, see 110 Cong. Rec. 2788 (1964), because he feared that § 708 and similar provisions in other titles were "wholly inadequate to preserve the validity and force of State laws aimed at discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 59 (1963) (additional views of Hon. George
Meader). His version provided that state laws would not be pre-empted
"except to the extent that there is a direct and positive conflict between
such provisions so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand
together." 110 Cong. Rec. 2787 !1964). The amendment ultimately
adopted by Congress was a substitute offered by Rep. Mathias without
17
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to whether the state law is fundamentally inconsistent with
the purposes of Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The
issue is whether the state statute stands "as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941), and, as always in pre-emption cases, "[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)).
Petitioners argue that the language of the federal statute
itself unambiguously rejects California's "special treatment"
approach to pregnancy discrimination, thus rendering any resort to legislative history unnecessary. Since § 1104 directs
our inquiry to the purpose of the federal statute, however,
we must examine the PDA's language against the background of its legislative history and historical context. As to
the language of the PDA, "[i]t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit; nor within the intention
of its ·makers.'" United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U. S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892)). See Train v. Col- ·
orado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976);
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534,
543-544 (1940).
It is well established that the PDA was passed in reaction

to this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
supra. "When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding
and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision."
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462
objection from Rep. Meader. !d., at 2789 (1964). There is no indication
that this substitution altered ~he basic thrust of § 1104.
Perhaps for these reason, we have in the past relied primarily on § 708 to
resolve issues of pre-emption under Title VII. See Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 101, 103 (1983).

--~~--· ::--
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U. S. 669, 678 (1983). By adding pregnancy to the definition
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the first clause
of the PDA reflects Congress' disapproval of the reasoning in
Gilbert. Newport News, supra, at 678-679 & n. 17 (citing
legislative history). Rather than imposing a limitation on
the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second
clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to
illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied. Cf. Newport News, supra, at 678 n. 14 ("The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the second clause,
which explains the application of the general principle to
women employees"); see also id., at. 688 (REHNQUIST,
J.,
dissenting). 18
The context in which Congress considered the issue of
pregnancy discrimination supports a view of the PDA as a
floor, rather than a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits. Congress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination
against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insurance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977). 19 The reports, debates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Congress intended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to

Jtt

18

Several commentators have construed the second clause of the PDA in
this way. See, e. g., Note, Employment Equality Under The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L. J. 929, 937 (1985); Note, Sexual
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 690,
696 & n. 26 (1983).
11
See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on
S. 995 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-33 (1977) (statement of Vice
Chairman Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ethel Bent
Walsh); id., at 113-117 (statement of Wendy W. Williams); id., at 117-121
(statement of Susan Deller Ross); id., at 307-310 (statement of Bella S.
· Abzug). See also Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis
of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on H. R. 5055 and H. R. 6075 before the
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

J
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end discrimination against pregnant workers. 20 In contrast
to the thorough account of discrimination against pregnant
workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of
preferential treatment of pregnancy, beyond acknowledgments of the existence of state statutes providing for such
preferential treatment. See infra, at - - . Opposition to
the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans and the
application of the bill to abortion, 21 not from those who favored special accommodation of pregnancy.
In support of their argument that the PDA prohibits employment practices that favor pregnant women, ·petitioners
and several amici cite statements in the legislative history to
the effect that the PDA does not require empl.oyers to extend
any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees. For example, the House
Report explained that the proposed legislation "does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner . . . . H. R. 6075 in n'o way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist." 22 We
20
See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 8144 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bay h) (legislation ''will end employment discrimination against pregnant workers"); 124
Cong Rec. 21446 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords some 41
percent of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection and
security without fear of reprisal due to to their decision to bear children");
id., at 21442 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill "would put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between family and
career-dearly a function of sex bias in the law"); id., at 36818 (remarks of
Sen. Javits) (the "bill represents only basic fairness for women employees"); id., at 38574 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (my subcommittee "learned
of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we
learned of the hardships this discrimination brought to women and their
families").
n See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 9 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 46 (discussing cost objections); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1786, pp. 3-4 (1978), Leg.
Hist., at 196-197 (application of the PDA to abortion).
21
H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, p. at 4 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 150. See also S.
Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4, Leg. Hist., at 41; 123 Cong. Rec. 7540 (1977)
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do not interpret these references to support petitioners' construction of the statute. On the contrary, if Congress had
intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have
been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed only its
intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had
intended to prohibit such treatment.
We also find it significant that Congress was aware of state
laws similar to California's but apparently did not consider
them inconsistent with the PDA. In the debates and reports
on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged the existence
of state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 23 Two of the States mentioned then required employers to provide reasonable leave
to pregnant workers. 24 After citing these state laws, Con(remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 10582 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins);
id., at 28387 (remarks of Sen. Javits); iif,., at 29664 (remarks of Sen.
Brooke).
23
See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) , Leg.
Hist., at 67 ("several state legislatures . . . have chosen to address the
problem by mandating certain types of benefits for pregnant employees").
See also S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3, Leg. Hist., at 40; H. R. Rep.
No. 95-948, supra, at 10-11, Leg. Hist., at 156-157; 123 Cong. Rec. 29648
(1977) (list of states that require coverage for pregnancy and pregnancyrelated disabilities); id., at 29662 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
"'See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977), now codified at § 45a60(a)(7) (1985); Mont. Rev. Codes § 41-2602 (Smith Supp. 1977), now codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311 (West 1985). The
Connecticut statute provided, in relevant part:
"It shall be an unfair employment practice
"(g) For any employer . .. (ii) to refuse to grant to [a pregnant] employee
a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from such pregnancy. . . . . Upon signifying her intent to return, such employee shall be
reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent
pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so."

·- :----- --- ,-:.:._-_- ----------

85-494-0PINION
CALIFORNIA FEDERALS. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

17

gress failed to evince the requisite "clear and manifest purpose" to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 206 (1983). To the contrary, both
the House and Senate Reports suggest that these laws would
continue to have effect under the PDA. 25
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and California's pregnancy disability leave statute share a common goal. The
purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that had operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.
424, 429-430 (1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U. S. 69, 75 n. 7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). Rather than limiting existing Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends
them to cover pregnancy. 26 As Senator Williams, a sponsor
of the Act, stated: "The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully
in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental
right to full participation in family life." 123 Cong. Rec.
29658 (1977).
The Montana statute was virtually identical. Both have been recodified
in current statutory compilations, but the leave and reinstatement requirements are unchanged.
ill For example, the Senate Report states: "Since title VII does not preempt State laws which would not require violating title VII . . . , these
States would continue to be able to enforce their State laws if the bill were
enacted." S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3 n. 1, Leg. Hist., at 40.
ill "Proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized that the Supreme Court
had erroneously interpreted congressional intent and that the amending
legislation was necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as
they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision." Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 679 (1983).

:---..,.--:-~===-",....,.....~===,....,.,,.,.,.....---._....,,.......,_...,.....,_

_ _,...,._
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Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment
opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women
after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, § 12945(b)(2)
ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability. 27 California's approach is consistent with
the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted in enacting the
PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), a
Title VI decision, JusTICE BRENNAN stated:
"[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a social context and, therefore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the desired end products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due
consideration of the uniqueness of the 'disadvantaged' individuals. A realistic understanding of conditions found
in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy
·into account in fashioning disability policies." 429
U. S., at 159 (footnote omitted).
By "taking pregnancy into account," California's pregnancy
disability leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have
families without losing their jobs. 28
zr As authoritatively construed by respondent Commission, the provision
will "insure that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions have equal employment opportunities as persons not so affected:" Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2 § 7291.2(c) (proposed regulation).
28
We emphasize the limited nature of the benefits § 12945(b )(2) provides.
The California statute is not based on stereotypes or generalizations about
the needs and abilities of pregnant workers. · Such stereotypical assumptions would be inconsistent with equal employment opportunity for women.;
''if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 725 (1982). See also Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 709 (1978); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, 545 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). However, § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archaic or stereotypic
notions about pregnancy. Disability due to pregnancy is not a stereotype
and the California statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of
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Thus petitioners' facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2) fails.
The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by
the PDA, since the two statutory bases for pre-emption are
lacking in this case. Section 12945(b)(2) does not require the
doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII, nor is it
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute. 29
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.
It Because we conclude that in enacting the PDA Congress did not intend
to prohibit all favorable treatment of pregnancy, we need not address
whether § 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a legislative response to leave policies that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-494

CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARK GUERRA,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1986]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy.
I
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
Cal. Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp.
1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits discrimination in employment and housing. In September 1978, California amended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Cal.
Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 1,
p. 4320-4322, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). 1 Subdivision (b)(2)-the provi'Section 12945(b)(2) provides, in relevant part:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification:
"(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . .. ."
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sion at issue here-is the only portion of the statute that applies to employers subject to Title VII. See § 12945(e). 2 It
requires these employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the
state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA, 3 has con"(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of
time; provided, such period shall not exceed four months. . . . Reasonable
period of time means that peri<>Q during which the female employee is
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions. . .. "
"An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pursuant to this section to give reasonable notice of the date such leave shall
commence and the estimated duration of such leave."
Originally, the statute was intended to reverse, as to California employers, the rule established by this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). At the time, California law prohibited
school districts from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, see former
Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.2 (1977), now codified at Cal. Gov't Code
Ann. § 12943 (West 1980). The first version of§ 12945 simply imposed this
requirement on all California employers with five or more employees. As
a result of employer opposition, however, the measure was amended to include the various provisions now found in § 12945.
2
Aware that legislation on this subject was pending before Congress,
the State Legislature added the following section:
"In the event Congress enacts legislation amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
the provisions of this act, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) ... shall
be inapplicable to any employer subject to such federal law .... " 1978
Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 4, p. 4322.
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, this section rendered the state law, except subdivision (b)(2), invalid as applied to
all employers covered by Title VII. California subsequently adopted subdivision (e), which provides:
"The provisions of this section, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b),
shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964."
3
See Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 12935(a)(1) and 12935(h). Respondent
Department of Fair Employment and Housing is the state agency charged
with enforcing the FEHA. See § 12930.
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strued § 12945(b)(2) to require California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to
the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available
due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer
must make a reasonable, good faith effort to place the employee in a substantially similar job. 4 The statute does not
compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employees. Because unpaid leave is meaningless unless there is a
job to which to return, the only benefit pregnant workers
actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to
reinstatement.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex.
However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125
(1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. 5 In
'The parties have stipulated that the Commission's interpretation of
§ 12945(b)(2) is set forth in its proposed regulation, Cal. Admin. Code tit. 2,
§ 7291.2. See also Matter of the Accusation of the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing v. Travel Express, Case No. FEP80-81
A7- 0992s N18709 83-17 (Aug. 4, 1983) (precedential Commission decision
construing § 12945(b)(2)).
5
In General Electric Co . v. Gilbert, the Court held that an otherwise
comprehensive disability insurance plan did not violate Title VII because it
failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Relying on Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974) , which upheld a similar plan against a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, the Court concluded that
removing pregnancy from the list of compensable disabilities was not discrimination on the basis of sex. 429 U. S. 125, 133-136 (1976). The Court
further held that "[a]s there is no proof that the package is in fact worth
more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme .. . ." ld., at 138.
Three members of the Court dissented. See id., at 146 (BRENNAN, J .,
dissenting); id., at 160 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices
would have held that the employer's disability plan discriminated on the
basis of sex by giving men protection for all categories of risk but giving
women only partial protection.
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response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 6
II
Petitioner California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan association based in Los Angeles; it is an employer covered by
both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neutral leave policy that permits employees who have completed
three months of service to take unpaid leave of absence for a
variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Although it is Cal Fed's policy to try to provide an employee
taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning,
Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an employee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is
not available.
Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist
for several years. In January 1982, she took a pregnancy
disability leave. When she was able to return to work in
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 143-146 (1977), the Court
relied on Gilbert to uphold an employer's sick-leave policy that excluded
pregnancy.
6
The PDA added subsection (k) to§ 701, the definitional section of Title
VII. Subsection (k) provides, in relevant part:
"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise."
The legislative history of the PDA reflects Congress' approval of the views
of the dissenters in Gilbert. See N eurport News Shipbuilding & Dry dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 678-679, and nn. 15-17 (1983) (citing legislative history).
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April of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was informed that her job had been filled and that there were no
receptionist or similar positions available. Garland filed a
complaint with respondent Department of Fair Employment
and Housing, which issued an administrative accusation
against Cal Fed on her behalf. 7 Respondent charged Cal
Fed with violating§ 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the
scheduled hearing before respondent Fair Housing and Employment Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California
Chamber of Commerce, 8 brought this action in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California.
They sought a declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent
with and pre-empted by Title VII and an injunction against
enforcement of the section. 9 The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. 33 EPD ~ 34,227,
34 FEP cases 562 (1984). Citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669 (1983), 10 the
7

Cal Fed reinstated Garland in a receptionist position in November
1982, seven months after she first notified it that she was able to return to
work.
8
Petitioner Merchants and Manufacturers Association is a trade association that represents numerous employers throughout the State of California. Petitioner California Chamber of Commerce also represents many
California businesses. Both organizations have members that are subject
to both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2) and have disability-leave policies similar
to Cal Fed's.
9
Petitioners' complaint also alleged that the California disability leave
statute was pre-empted by § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The parties stipulated that
the petitioners' ERISA claim would be dismissed without prejudice. App.
JA9-JA10, nn. 1, 2.
10
In Newport News , the Court evaluated a health insurance plan that
provided female employees with benefits for pregnancy-related conditions
to the same extent as for other medical conditions, but provided less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees. The Court found
that this limitation discriminated against male employees with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment in
violation § 703(a)(l) of Title VII. "The 1978 Act [the PDA] makes clear

85-494-0PINION
6

CALIFORNIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

court stated that "California employers who comply with
state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits under
Title VII brought by temporarily disabled males who do not
receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by
pregnancy .... " On this basis, the District Court held that
"California state law and the policies of interpretation and enforcement . . . which require preferential treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions are preempted by Title VII and are null,
void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution." 33 EPD ~ 34, 227, 34 FEP
cases at 568. 11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 758 F. 2d 390 (1985). It held that "the district
court's conclusion that section 12945(b)(2) discriminates
against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense,
misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA."
Id., at 393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading of
Newport News, the Court of Appeals found that the PDA
does not "demand that state law be blind to pregnancy's existence." Id., at 395. The court held that in enacting the
PDA Congress intended "to construct a floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling
above which they may not rise." Id., at 396. Because it
that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other conditions. Thus petitioner's plan unlawfully gives married male employees a benefit package for their dependents that is less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married female
employees." 462 U. S., at 684.
11
After the District Court entered its judgment, Garland moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). The District Court denied
her motion on several grounds: untimeliness, lack of a "direct and substantial" interest in the litigation, and adequate representation of her interests
by defendants. Her appeal from the order denying intervention was consolidated with the appeal on the merits. In an unreported order, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention;
Garland did not seek review of that decision here.
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found that the California statute furthers the goal of equal
employment opportunity for women, the Court of Appeals
concluded: "Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with,
nor unlawful under, Title VII." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. - - (1986), and we now
affirm.
III
In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by
federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the
intent of Congress. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp ., 435 U. S.
497, 504 (1978). Federal law may supersede state law in
several different ways. First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law
by so stating in express terms. E. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Second, congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).
Neither of these bases for pre-emption exists in this case.
Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent to categorically
pre-empt state law or to "occupy the field" of employment
discriminationlaw. See42U. S.C. §§2000e-7and2000h-4.
As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has
not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict occurs either because
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or because the state law
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Michigan Canners
& Freezers Assn. Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 478 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 156 (1982).
Nevertheless, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed.
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981).
This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in this case. In
two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, §§ 708 and 1104,
Congress has indicated that state laws will be pre-empted
only if they actually conflict with federal law. Section 708 of
Title VII provides:
"Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or
punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any
such law which purports to require or permit the doing
of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title." § 2000e-7
Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil
Rights Act, establishes the following standard for preemption:
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to
occupy the field in which any such title operates to the
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor
shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof." § 2000h-4
Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressional intent to
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title
VII; these two sections provide a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority" to regulate
employment practice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra,
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at 505. We therefore must consider whether § 12945(b)(2)
"requires or permits" employers to violate Title VII or is inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII.
A
We turn first to § 708, the statutory provision specifically
addressed to pre-emption under Title VII. The House Report on the bill from which the language of § 708 was drawn
indicates that this section "might be called an antipreemption
provision." H. R. Rep. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 14 (1962). Instead of pre-empting state fair employment
laws, § 708 "'simply left them where they were before the enactment of Title VII.'" Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 103, n. 24 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v.

Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (Conn. 1978), affirmance order,
603 F. 2d 214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1031
(1980)). The narrow scope of pre-emption available under
§ 708 reflects the importance Congress attached to state antidiscrimination laws in achieving Title VII's goal of equal employment opportunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 101-102; Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468-469, 472, 477 (1982); New
York Gaslight Club, Inc . v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63-65
(1980). 12 The legislative history of the PDA also supports a
narrow interpretation of § 708. 13 Applying these principles
12

For example, where state or local law prohibits an employment practice, § 706(c) requires deferral of federal enforcement until state or local officials have an opportunity "to act under such State or local law to remedy
the practice alleged." § 2000e-5(d).
13
See, e. g, S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3, n. 1 (1977) (state laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would not be pre-empted, "[s]ince
title VII does not pre-empt State laws which would not require violating
title VII"), Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 (Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources), p. 40 (1980) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); 123 Cong. Rec.
29643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (state laws that create a "clear conflict" would be pre-empted).
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in Shaw, we concluded that Title VII did not pre-empt a New
York statute which proscribed discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy as sex discrimination, at a time when Title VII did
not equate the two. 463 U. S., at 100-104.
Petitioners contend that the second clause of the PDA requires equal treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities.
They argue that, because Title VII forbids an employer to
treat a pregnant employee any differently than other disabled employees and because, whatever an employer's leave
and reinstatement policy for disabled employees generally,
§ 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide reasonable unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers, the California statute requires them to violate Title VII, as amended
by the PDA.
Adopting for the sake of argument petitioners' view that
the PDA requires employers to treat pregnancy no better
than other disabilities, the California statute in no way "requires" employers to violate Title VII. 14 If the federal statute forbids employers to provide unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers and not to other disabled
employees, a question we address below, § 12945(b)(2) does
not prevent employers from complying with federal as well as
the state law simply by raising the level of benefits to other
disabled employees. This is not a case where "compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
•• Petitioners assert that even if§ 12945(b)(2) does not require employers
to treat pregnant employees differently from other disabled employees, it
permits employers to do so because it does not specifically prohibit different treatment. If we were to interpret the term "permit" as expansively
as petitioners suggest, however, the State would be required to incorporate every prohibition contained in Title VII into its state law, since it
would otherwise be held to "permit" any employer action it did not expressly prohibit. We conclude that "permit" in § 708 must be interpreted
to pre-empt only those state laws that expressly sanction a practice unlawful under Title VII; the term does not pre-empt state laws that are silent
on the practice.

J
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U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where there is an "inevitable
collision between the two schemes of regulation." I d., at
143. Section 12945(b)(2) does not compel California employers to treat pregnant workers better than other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits that employers must,
at a minimum, provide to pregnant workers. Employers are
free to extend comparable benefits to other disabled employees, thereby treating "women affected by pregnancy" the
same as "other persons not so affected but similarly situated
in their ability or inability to work." 15
We recognize that reading the state and federal statutes
together in this fashion may yield a result that neither statute independently requires. Whenever there is concurrent
state and federal regulation in a particular area, however,
the intersection of the two layers of regulation may have results different from those intended by either of the regulating
authorities. 16 Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U. S. 117, 131, n. 22 (1978) (state statute requiring oil refiners to give a "voluntary allowance" to service stations not
pre-empted despite the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act
may compel its extension to out-of-state stations). In the
Title VII context, such a result is the logical consequence of
Congress' decision to allow the States a significant role in the
formulation of antidiscrimination law. Each government is
allowed to pursue its own policy. The State's decision that
equal employment opportunity for pregnant workers re16
Indeed, at oral argument, petitioners conceded that compliance with
both "is theoretically possible." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
16
Moreover, Congress and the California Legislature were each aware in
general terms of the regulatory scheme adopted by the other when they
enacted their legislation. California recognized that many of its provisions
would be pre-empted by the PDA and , accordingly, exempted employers
covered by Title VII from all portions of the statute except those guaranteeing unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers. Congress
was aware that some state laws mandated certain benefits for pregnant
workers, but did not indicate that they would be pre-empted by federal
law. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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quires at a minimum reasonable unpaid leave with job protection is given effect, as is the Federal Government's policy of
equal treatment.
Petitioners argue that "extension" of the state statute to
cover other employees is inappropriate in the absence of a
clear indication that this is what the California Legislature
intended. They cite cases in which this Court has declined
to rewrite underinclusive state statutes found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Wrengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393, n. 13 (1979). This
argument is beside the point. Extension is a remedial option
to be exercised by a court once a statute is found to be
invalid. See, e. g., Califano v. Wescott, 443 U. S. 76, 89
(1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)). Since the statute does not require that pregnant workers be treated
differently, we need not address the relative merits of extension and nullification.
B
Having determined that the California statute does not require an employer to violate Title VII and is therefore not
pre-empted under § 708, we next consider whether it is preempted under § 1104. The legislative history indicates that
this section, like § 708, must be read narrowly. It was not
intended to extend significantly the scope of pre-emption
available under § 708. 17 Accordingly, our inquiry is limited
17
Representative Meader, one of the sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, proposed the precursor to § 1104 as an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act, see 110 Cong. Rec. 2788 (1964), because he feared that § 708 and similar provisions in other titles were "wholly inadequate to preserve the validity and force of State laws aimed at discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 59 (1963) (additional views of Hon. George
Meader). His version provided that state laws would not be pre-empted
"except to the extent that there is a direct and positive conflict between
such provisions so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand
together." 110 Cong. Rec. 2787 (1964). The amendment ultimately
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to whether the state law is fundamentally inconsistent with
the purposes of Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The
issue is whether the state statute stands "as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941), and, as always in pre-emption cases, "[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U. S., at 504 (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)).
Petitioners argue that the language of the federal statute
itself unambiguously rejects California's "special treatment"
approach to pregnancy discrimination, thus rendering any resort to legislative history unnecessary. Since § 1104 directs
our inquiry to the purpose of the federal statute, however,
we must examine the PDA's language against the background of its legislative history and historical context. As to
the language of the PDA, "'[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers."' Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 201
(1979) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892)). See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); United
States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544
(1940).
It is well established that the PDA was passed in reaction
to this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.
"When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the
reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision." Newport
adopted by Congress was a substitute offered by Rep. Mathias without
objection from Rep. Meader. !d., at 2789. There is no indication that
this substitution altered the basic thrust of § 1104.
Perhaps for these reasons, we have in the past relied primarily on § 708
to resolve issues of pre-emption under Title VII. See Shaw v. Delta A ir
Lines, Inc ., 463 U. S. 85, 101, 103 (1983).
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News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. 8., at
678. By adding pregnancy to the definition of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the first clause of the
PDA reflects Congress' disapproval of the reasoning in Gilbert. Neu;port News, supra, at 678-679, and n. 17 (citing
legislative history). Rather than imposing a limitation on
the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second
clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to
illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied. Cf. 462 U. 8., at 678, n. 14 ("The meaning of the first
clause is not limited by the specific language in the second
clause, which explains the application of the general principle
to women employees"); see also id., at 688 (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting). 18
The context in which Congress considered the issue of
pregnancy discrimination supports a view of the PDA as a
floor, rather than a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits. Congress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination
against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insurance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977). 19 The reports, debates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Congress intended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to
8

Several commentators have construed the second clause of the PDA in
this way. See, e. g., Note, Employment Equality Under The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L. J. 929, 937 (1985); Note, Sexual
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 690,
696, and n. 26 (1983).
'"See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on
S. 995 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 31-33 (1977) (statement of
Vice Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ethel Bent
Walsh); i d., at 113-117 (statement of Wendy W. Williams); id., at 117-121
(statement of Susan Deller Ross); id. , at 307-310 (statement of Bella S.
Abzug). See also Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis
of Pregnancy, Hearings on H. R. 5055 and H. R. 6075 before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
'
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end discrimination against pregnant workers. 20 In contrast
to the thorough account of discrimination against pregnant
workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of
preferential treatment of pregnancy, beyond acknowledgments of the existence of state statutes providing for such
preferential treatment. See infra, at - - . Opposition to
the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans and the
application of the bill to abortion, 21 not from those who favored special accommodation of pregnancy.
In support of their argument that the PDA prohibits employment practices that favor pregnant women, petitioners
and several amici cite statements in the legislative history to
the effect that the PDA does not require employers to extend
any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees. For example, the House
Report explained that the proposed legislation "does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner . . . . H. R. 6075 in no way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist." 22 We
20
See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 8144 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (legislation "will end employment discrimination against pregnant workers"); 124
Cong Rec. 21440 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords some 41
percent of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection and
security without fear of reprisal due to to their decision to bear children");
id., at 21442 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill "would put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between family and
career-clearly a function of sex bias in the law"); id., at 36818 (remarks of
Sen. Javits) (the "bill represents only basic fairness for women employees"); i d., at 38574 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (my subcommittee "learned
of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we
learned of the hardships this discrimination brought to women and their
families").
21
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 9 (1977), Leg. Hist. 46 (discussing
cost objections); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95- 1786, pp. 3-4 (1978), Leg. Hist.
196-197 (application of the PDA to abortion).
22
H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, p. at 4 (1978), Leg. Hist. 150. See also S.
Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4, Leg. Hist. 41; 123 Cong. Rec. 7540 (1977)
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do not interpret these references to support petitioners' construction of the statute. On the contrary, if Congress had
intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have
been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed only its
intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had
intended to prohibit such treatment.
We also find it significant that Congress was aware of state
laws similar to California's but apparently did not consider
them inconsistent with the PDA. In the debates and reports
on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged the existence
of state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 23 Two of the States mentioned then required employers to provide reasonable leave
to pregnant workers. 24 After citing these state laws, Con(remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 10582 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins); id., at
29387 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 29664 (remarks of Sen. Brooke).
"'See, e. g., id., at 29387 (remarks of Sen. Javits), Leg. Hist. 67 ("several state legislatures ... have chosen to address the problem by mandating certain types of benefits for pregnant employees"). See also S. Rep.
No. 95-331, supra, at 3, Leg. Hist. 40; H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, supra, at
10-11, Leg. Hist. 156-157; 123 Cong. Rec. 29648 (1977) (list of States that
require coverage for pregnancy and pregnancy-related disabilities); id., at
29662 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
24
See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977), now codified at § 46a60(a)(7) (1985); Mont. Rev. Codes § 41-2602 (Smith Supp. 1977), now codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311 (1986). The Connecticut statute provided, in relevant part:
"It shall be an unfair employment practice
"(g) For an employer ... (ii) to refuse to grant to [a pregnant] employee a
reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from such pregnancy .... (iii) Upon signifying her intent to return, such employee shall
be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other
service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do
so." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977).
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gress failed to evince the requisite "clear and manifest purpose" to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 206 (1983). To the contrary, both
the House and Senate Reports suggest that these laws would
continue to have effect under the PDA. 25
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and California's pregnancy disability leave statute share a common goal. The
purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.
424, 429-430 (1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U. S. 69, 75, n. 7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. , 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). Rather than limiting existing Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends
them to cover pregnancy. 26 As Senator Williams, a sponsor
of the Act, stated: "The entire thrust ... behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully
and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life." 123 Gong.
Rec. 29658 (1977).
The Montana statute was virtually identical. Both have been recodified
in current statutory compilations, but the leave and reinstatement requirements are unchanged.
26
For example, the Senate Report states: "Since title VII does not preempt State laws which would not require violating title VII . . . , these
States would continue to be able to enforce their State laws if the bill were
enacted." S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3, n. 1, Leg. Hist. 40.
26
"Proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized that the Supreme Court
had erroneously interpreted congressional intent and that the amending
legislation was necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as
they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision." Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC , 462 U. S., at 679.

85-494-0PINION
18

CALIFORNIA FEDERALS. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA

Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment
opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women
after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, § 12945(b)(2)
ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability. 27 California's approach is consistent with
the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted in enacting the
PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), a
Title VI decision, JUSTICE BRENNAN stated:
"[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a social context and, therefore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the desired end products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due
consideration of the uniqueness of the 'disadvantaged' individuals. A realistic understanding of conditions found
in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy
into account in fashioning disability policies." 429
U. S., at 159 (footnote omitted).
By "taking pregnancy into account," California's pregnancy
disability leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have
families without losing their jobs. 28
Z7

As authoritatively construed by respondent Commission, the provision

will "insure that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-

cal conditions have equal employment opportunities as persons not so affected." Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Commission's Proposed
Regulation § 7291.2(c) see App. JA49.
28
We emphasize the limited nature of the benefits§ 12945(b)(2) provides.
The California statute is not based on stereotypes or generalizations about
the needs and abilities of pregnant workers. Such stereotypical assumptions would be inconsistent with equal employment opportunity for women;
"if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 725 (1982). See also Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U. S. 702, 709 (1978); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, 545 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). However, § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archaic or stereotypic
notions about pregnancy. Disability due to pregnancy is not a stereotype
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Thus petitioners' facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2) fails.
The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by
the PDA, since the two statutory bases for pre-emption are
lacking in this case. Section 12945(b)(2) does not require the
doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII , nor is it
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute. 29
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

and the California statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of
actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.
29
Because we conclude that in enacting the PDA Congress did not intend
to prohibit all favorable treatment of pregnancy, we need not address
whether § 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a legislative response to leave policies that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers.
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